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Abstract—Convolutional Neural Networks (CNN) based meth-
ods have significantly improved the performance of image ste-
ganalysis compared with conventional ones based on hand-crafted
features. However, many existing literatures on computer vision
have pointed out that those effective CNN-based methods can
be easily fooled by adversarial examples [1]. In this paper, we
propose a novel steganography framework based on adversarial
example in an iterative manner. The proposed framework first
starts from an existing embedding cost, such as J-UNIWARD
[2] in this work, and then updates the cost iteratively based
on adversarial examples derived from a series of steganalytic
networks until achieving satisfactory results. We carefully analyze
two important factors that would affect the security performance
of the proposed framewrork, i.e. the percentage of selected
gradients with larger amplitude and the adversarial intensity
to modify embedding cost. The experimental results evaluated
on three modern steganalytic models, including GFR, SCA-GFR
and SRNet, show that the proposed framework is very promising
to enhance the security performances of JPEG steganography.
I. INTRODUCTION
Image steganography aims to hide secret message into
digital image in an imperceptible manner, which has attracted
much attention in the past decade. Up to now, many steganog-
raphy methods have been proposed.
Most modern steganography methods are constructed un-
der the framework of distortion minimization, such as S-
UNIWARD [2] and HILL [3] in spatial domain, J-UNIWARD
[2] and UERD [4] in JPEG domain. The most important issue
in these methods is to assign proper costs for all embedding
units (pixels / DCT coefficients). Then, the common operation
- syndrome-trellis coding (STC) [5] - is used for subsequent
data embedding. However, most existing costs are usually
empirical and symmetrical (i.e. the cost for +1 and −1 for any
embedding unit are exactly the same). Taking J-UNIWARD
for example, it firstly uses three fixed wavelet directional
filters to assess the texture complexity of cover image, and
then defines the embedding costs of both +1 and −1 as
the sum of relative changes of wavelet coefficients. In this
way, embedding modifications will be located at those regions
with higher complexity that seem hard to model. To enhance
existing steganography significantly, some asymmetry costs
based on data-driven methods are worth studying.
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Recently, CNN-based steganalytic methods, such as [6], [7],
can achieve the state-of-the-art results on image steganalysis
compared with conventional methods based on hand-crafted
features. However, many existing literatures in computer vi-
sion, such as [1], [8], pointed out that an adversarial example
designed for a targeted CNN-based model is often useful for
fooling other models with different structures. Inspired by this,
several steganography methods based on adversarial examples
have been proposed. In [9], Ma et al proposed a method
generating steganographic adversarial examples according to
gradient map and embedding modification positions in spatial
domain. In [10], Tang et al proposed a JPEG stegnogarphy
based on adversarial example. In this method, the DCT coef-
ficients are divided into two non-overalpping parts randomly,
and then data embedding is performed in two steps. Firstly,
the method embeds secret message into the first part using
J-UNIWARD [2]. Secondly, it updates the embedding cost
in the other part according to adversarial example, and then
embeds the rest message into this part. In [11], Zhang et al
constructed enhanced covers by adding adversarial noise to
cover based on adversarial example technique. Those enhanced
covers have better characteristics for enhancing the security
of existing steganography in spatial domain. Although the
existing methods based on adversarial example can outperform
the corresponding steganography, there is a lots of room for
further improvement based on our experiments.
In this paper, we propose a novel steganography framework
based on adversarial example in an iterative manner. We first
set the initial embedding cost of input cover images using
some existing steganography methods, such as such as J-
UNIWARD [2] in this paper, we then update the embedding
cost iteratively using adversarial attack to a CNN based stegan-
alyzer until achieving satisfactory results. Experimental results
show that the proposed framework can significantly enhance
the existing JPEG steganography evaluated on both deep
learning based steganalyzers and the conventional ones. Please
note that although both our method and the method in [10]
aim to enhance J-UNIWARD based on adversarial examples,
there are some important differences between them: 1) With
iterative adversarial attacks, we aim to update embedding costs
multiple times, while the method [10] aims to find a proper
amount of adjust elements; 2) We embed the whole secret
message into JPEG directly, while the method [10] processed
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Fig. 1. The training stage in the proposed steganography framework
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Fig. 2. The process of generating image stego
it in two batches; 3) We just update those embedding costs
with larger gradient amplitudes rather than a random way in
[10]; 4) For updating embedding cost, we use an additive way
instead of multiplicative one in [10].
The rest of this paper is arranged as follows. Section II
describes the proposed steganpgraphy framework. Section III
shows the results and analysis. Finally, the concluding remarks
of this paper would be given in Section IV.
II. PROPOSED STEGANOGRAPHY FRAMEWORK
The proposed steganography framework includes two
stages, that is, training a steganography model using iterative
adversarial attacks and generating stego images based on
the pre-trained steganography model. Please note that images
employed in the two stages are different.
A. Training a Steganography Model
As illustrated in Fig. 1, the proposed framework firstly
obtains the initial embedding cost set Q0 of cover image
set C using some existing steganography method, such as
J-UNIWARD. And then the cost set will be updated T − 1
times in the proposed network training loop, where T ≥ 2.
For the ith iteration (i = 0, 1 . . . T − 1), we first obtain
image stego set Si according to the cover image set C and
their embedding cost set Qi. We then train a steganalytic
network Ni evaluated on the two image sets, i.e. (C, Si).
Based on the network Ni, we can obtain the corresponding
gradients of the embedding units (i.e. DCT coefficients) for
each cover image in C by back-propagation. For the jth
cover in C, denoted as cj , we first sort the absolute gradients
of its DCT coefficients in descending order, and then select
top p gradients, where 0 < p ≤ 1. Finally, we update the
corresponding embedding costs with the selected gradients
based on the following formulas.
ρ+i+1,j(x, y) =
{
ρ+i,j(x, y) + 1 gi,j(x, y) < 0
ρ+i,j(x, y) + α gi,j(x, y) > 0
(1)
ρ−i+1,j(x, y) =
{
ρ−i,j(x, y) + α gi,j(x, y) < 0
ρ−i,j(x, y) + 1 gi,j(x, y) > 0
(2)
where ρ+/−i,j (x, y) denotes the embedding cost for the j
th
cover in cover set C in the ith iteration; (x, y) denotes the
coordinate of embedding cost to be updated; superscript (i.e.
+ or −) denotes the modification direction 1; the parameter α
denotes the adversarial intensity for adjusting the cost, where
α > 1 ; gi,j(x, y) denotes the corresponding selected gradient
with the network Ni.
1Most existing steganography methods employ a symmetrical embedding
scheme, which assumes that the cost of modifying each embedding unit by
+1 and −1 are the same, i.e. ρ = ρ+ = ρ−. However, the proposed
steganography uses an asymmetry way, which can be observed from the
equations (1) and (2).
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Fig. 3. The CNN based steganalytic model used in the proposed framework
B. Generating Stegos Based on Pre-trained Model
The process of generating image stego is as illustrated in
Fig. 2. For a given JPEG cover c, we first obtain its embedding
cost using J-UNIWARD, denoted as ρ0,c . And then the cover
is fed to the T steganalytic networks obtained in previous
stage (i.e. Ni, i = 0, . . . , T − 1) to obtain the corresponding
gradients gi with a parameter p, and calculate T temporary
costs tmpi,c according to the following equation:
tmp+i,c(x, y) =
{
1 gi,c(x, y) < 0
α gi,c(x, y) > 0
(3)
tmp−i,c(x, y) =
{
α gi,c(x, y) < 0
1 gi,c(x, y) > 0
(4)
Finally, the proposed embedding cost ρc of the input cover
c is defined as follows:
ρ+c = ρ0,c +
T−1∑
i=0
tmp+i,c; ρ
−
c = ρ0,c +
T−1∑
i=0
tmp−i,c (5)
From the formulas (1)-(5), we observe that in each round of
cost updating, the embedding cost will become relatively larger
(α > 1) when its modification (+ or −) and the corresponding
gradient (g > 0 or g < 0) have the same direction.
III. EXPERIMENTAL RESULTS AND ANALYSIS
In our experiments, 20,000 uncompressed images of size
512× 512 are from BOSSBase-v1.01 [12] and BOWS2 [13].
We firstly resize the images into 256 × 256 using “imre-
size” in Matlab with default settings, and then divide the
resized images into two non-overlapping parts randomly. The
first part includes 10,000 images, which are used to train
a steganography model described in Section II. In this part,
we use 8,000 images for training, and the rest 2,000 images
for the validation. The second part includes 10,000 images,
which are used to generate JPEG stego images based on
the trained model. For a given quality factor, therefore, we
finally obtain 10,000 cover-stego image pairs. To evaluate
steganography security, we further divide the resulting 10,000
cover-stego image pairs into two non-overlapping parts. The
first part includes 5,000 image pairs, which are used to train
a steganalytic classifier using the steganalytic model in Fig. 3
and three modern steganalytic models (i.e. GFR [14], SCA-
GFR [15], and SRNet [7]) separately. The rest 5,000 image
pairs are used for testing.
In the following, we first describe the settings and pa-
rameters of the proposed steganography framework in our
experiments, and then show the comparative results evaluated
on different steganalytic classifers. Finally, we will provide
some experimental analysis about the proposed steganography.
A. Settings of the Proposed Framework
1) About Steganalytic Model: In the proposed framework,
we need to train a series of CNN based steganalytic models.
To obtain a better tradeoff between the effectiveness and time
complexity, we employ a modified version of our previous
work [6] for image steganalysis in spatial domain instead of
the current best steganalyzer in JPEG domain, i.e. SRNet
[7]. As illustrated in Fig. 3, the CNN based architecture
includes three modules, that is, the pre-processing, 4 layer
groups and a classifier. The pre-processing module consists of
42 high-pass filters used in SRM and a truncation function.
The 4 layer groups have a similar structure, that is, several
convolutional layers followed by a pooling layer. Group 1
contains 4 convolutional layers while group 2-4 contain 2. The
convolutional layers are of size 3×3 and followed by a batch
normalization layer and a ReLU activation function. Group 1-
3 use an average pooling of size 3×3 with the stride 2, while
group 4 employs a global covariance pooling. The classifier
consists of a fully-connected layer and a softmax function.
TABLE I
DETECTION ACCURACY (%) EVALUATED ON DIFFERENT STEGANALYTIC MODELS. THE EMBEDDING PAYLOAD HERE IS 0.40 BPNZ, AND THE VALUE
WITH AN ASTERISK DENOTES THE BETTER RESULT IN THE CORRESPONDING CASE.
Quality Factor GFR SCA-GFR SRNet Our Network in Fig.3J-UNIWARD Our Method J-UNIWARD Our Method J-UNIWARD Our Method J-UNIWARD Our Method
95 63.51 53.04 * 64.25 53.12 * 82.30 69.78 * 75.00 53.50 *
75 80.23 66.13 * 81.13 68.81 * 91.50 85.33 * 90.10 75.82 *
Fig. 4. The histograms of the modification frequency of embedding costs on 10,000 test images with the quality factor 95 (left) and 75 (right).
Based on our experiments, we find that such a steganalytic
model can achieve similar results to the SRNet [7], while the
time complexity is significantly decreased.
2) About Parameter Settings: There are several important
parameters in the proposed steganography scheme, including
the iteration number T of adversarial attacks, the percentage
p for the selected gradients with larger amplitude, and the
adversarial intensity α for adjusting embedding cost. Typically,
it is time-consuming to obtain the best parameter combination
of (T, p, α) with brute-force searching. In our experiments,
we employ a greedy way. First of all, we limit T is no larger
than 16, since the detection accuracy will not drop significantly
when T is larger than 12 based on our experiments. To obtain a
better (p, α), we first fix α = 2.5, and select the best parameter
p in the set of {0.1, 0.2, 0.3, 0.4, 0.5, 0.6, 1} according to
security performances in the first 8 rounds of iteration. When
the best p is selected, we further evaluate the performances
with different α in the 16 rounds of iteration. Here, we limit
α in the set of {1.5, 2.0, 2.5, 3.0} .
When payload is 0.40 bpnz, some experimental results eval-
uated on the validation dataset are shown in Fig. 6. From Fig.
6, we finally determine that the proper parameter combination
for QF = 95 and QF = 75 is {T = 16, p = 0.50, α = 2.5}
and {T = 16, p = 0.60, α = 3.0} separately.
B. Security Performances
Once the parameters are determined in previous section, it is
easily to generate stego image for any given cover as described
in section II-B. In this section, some security performances
evaluated on the test dataset will be given.
The experimental results for payload 0.40 bpnz are shown in
Table I. From table I, we observe that the proposed framework
can improve the security performance of J-UNIWARD on the
four steganalytic models. For instance, when QF = 95, the
detection accuracies with the current best steganalytic model
SRNet are 82.30% and 69.78% for J-UNIWARD and our
method separately, which means that there are over 12% im-
provement in this case. For the three other steganalytic models
(i.e. GFR, SCA-GFR and the proposed network), we obtain
over 10%, 11% and 21% improvements separately, which
is a significant improvement in current JPEG steganography.
Similar results can be obtained when QF = 75.
C. Analysis on the Modification of Embedding Cost
Since the proposed embedding cost can be regarded as a
modified version of the J-UNIWARD, we would provide some
experimental analysis on the modification of embedding cost
in this section.
1) Modification Positions: In each round of cost updating,
we just consider those embedding costs whose gradients with
larger amplitude because their changes would lead to faster
change of the loss function based on the characteristic of
gradients. In this section, we will provide two image examples
to show the corresponding positions of the selected embedding
costs with different parameter p.
As illustrated in Fig. 7, it is interesting to see that those
regions with high complexity usually have larger gradient
amplitude. Similar results can also be observed from other
image examples based on our experiments. Therefore, the
proposed method prefers to update those embedding cost that
located at the image regions with higher complexity, and
preserve smoother regions as they are.
2) Modification Frequency: In our experiments, the initial
embedding costs (i.e. J-UNIWARD) will be updated 16 times
using iterative adversarial examples. For each embedding cost,
thus, its frequency of being modified with the proposed method
is ranging from 0 to 16.
Fig. 5. The relative modification rates on 10,000 test images
Fig. 4 shows the histograms of the modification frequency
on all costs in 10,000 test images with the quality factors 95
and 75 separately. From Fig. 4, we observe that for both quality
factor, around 20% of the costs will not changed (see the red
bar) at all. While the proportion would increase from around
0.30% to around 16.80% with increasing the modification
frequency form 1 to 16, which means that most of the initial
embedding costs have been repeatedly updated.
3) Relative Modification Rate: For each embedding cost,
the absolute modification is ranging from 0 to 16 × α, and
around 80% of the initial costs have been modified with the
proposed method from Fig. 4. To measure the modification
of an image quantitatively, we define the relative modification
rate based on the following formula:∑ |ρ+c − ρc,0|+∑ |ρ−c − ρc,0|
2×∑ ρc,0 (6)
where ρc,0 and ρc = (ρ+c , ρ
−
c ) denote the embedding costs
of J-UNIWARD and our method.
Fig. 5 shows the violin-plot of the relative modification rates
for 10,000 test images. From Fig. 5, we observe that although
the proposed method would modify most embedding costs
several times, the relative modification rate is rather lower. On
average, the relative modification rate is 3.31% and 0.53% for
QF = 95 and QF = 75 separately, which is an interesting result
that we can significantly improve the security performance of
J-UNIWARD via modifying their embedding costs slightly.
IV. CONCLUSION
In this paper, we propose a novel framework to enhance
JPEG steganography using iterative adversarial examples. The
main contributions of this paper are as follows.
• Unlike existing steganography works based on adversarial
examples, we introduce a new framework to update JPEG
embedding costs according to selected gradients in an
iterative manner. The proposed framework is universal,
which is also expected to be effective in other steganog-
raphy, such as image in spatial domain.
• The proposed framework can significantly enhance the
security performances of the existing JPEG steganogra-
phy, especially for the targeted CNN-based steganalyer
employed in the framework.
• We analyze two important factors (i.e. p and α) that
would significantly affect the proposed steganography
framework, and provide some statistical characteristics of
the proposed embedding costs.
There are many issues worth further studying. For instance,
the proposed framework is still rely on an existing cost, i.e.
J-UNIWARD. The convergence property and the convergence
efficiency on other embedding costs such as flat or random cost
will be included. Besides, just one steganalytic model is used
in the proposed framework. Some new schemes combined with
different steganalytic networks and/or stego post-processing
[16] would be considered to further improve the speed and
security performance of the proposed framework.
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Fig. 6. Detection accuracies evaluated on the validation set (i.e. 2,000 cover-stego image pairs) with the increasing number of loops. The value at the 0-th
iteration is the detection accuracy on those images using original J-UNIWARD.
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Fig. 7. The positions of embedding costs to be updated according to the selected gradients with parameter p. The quality factor here is 95.
